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JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA:-- AN
EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED JUVENILE
COURT RULES AND A PLEA FOR DELAY
by Ralph E. Boches* and Gary T. Wienerman**
I. INTRODUCTION
In May of 1976 California's Judicial Council' tentatively adopted
"Proposed Juvenile Court Rules" (hereinafter referred to as Rules or
Proposed Rules).2 The Rules are intended to govern court administra-
tion, practice, and procedure in the juvenile courts throughout Califor-
nia.' Late in June the Proposed Rules were released to the general
* B.A. 1955 (Lake Forest College); J.D. 1959 (University of Michigan); Clinical
Professor of Law, Loyola University of Los Angeles School of Law.
** B.A. 1967 (California State University at Northridge); J.D. 1970 (Loyola Uni-
versity of Los Angeles School of Law); Clinical Professor of Law, Loyola University
of Los Angeles School of Law. Mr. Wienerman did not participate in the formulation
of suggestions in Part VIII of this article.
The authors express their appreciation for the planning and research assistance of
Manuel Jose Covarubbias, Mary Jo Cox and Joan Quinn, Loyola University School of
Law, class of 1977. Their further appreciation is extended to Mary Jo Cox for her role
in coordinating the project.
1. The Judicial Council exists pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Con-
stitution which provides in relevant part:
The Judicial Council consists of the Chief Justice and one other judge of the
Supreme Court, 3 judges of courts of appeal, 5 judges of superior courts, 3 judges
of municipal courts, and 2 judges of justice courts, each appointed by the Chief
Justice for a 2-year term; 4 members of the State Bar appointed by its governing
body for 2-year terms; and one member of each house of the Legislature appointed
as provided by the house.
The council may appoint an Administrative Director of the Courts, who serves at
its pleasure and performs functions delegated by the council or the Chief Justice,
other than adopting rules of court administration, practice and procedure.
To improve the administration of justice, the council shall survey judicial business
and make recommendations to the courts, make recommendations annually to the
Governor and Legislature, adopt rules for court administration, practice and pro-
cedure, not inconsistent with statute, and perform other functions prescribed by
statute.
CA. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1974).
2. ADVIsoRY COMMITrEE JUVENILE COURT RULES PROJECr, PROPOSED JUVENILE
COURT RULEs (Tentatively Adopted May 1976) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED RULES].
Revised Final Rules, effective July 1, 1977, were adopted by the Judicial Council on
November 13, 1976. Further revisions may be made prior to the effective date. For
comments on the final form see notes 174-187 infra and accompanying text. The com-
ments in this article are to the Proposed Rules and reflect the state of the law as of
May 1, 1976. They are generally applicable to the Final Rules.
3. PRoPosED RULES, id., at v.
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public for comment, with a comment deadline of October 1, 1976. 4 If
adopted by the Judicial Council the Proposed Rules will take effect Jan-
uary 1, 1977. 5
The procedural highlights of the Rules are: separate procedures for
wardship and dependency cases;" standards for intake, settlement, in-
formal supervision and filing of petitions; 7 referee procedures" and de-
tention procedures are clarified; 9 guidelines for discovery are estab-
lished;' 0 procedures at jurisdictional hearings are clarified;" in Welfare
and Institutions Code section 60012 dispositions the probation officer
must recommend a plan for reuniting the family;' 3 and procedures re-
lating to annual review, intercounty transfer, supplemental petitions, or-
ders of modification, and appeals are clarified.' 4
This article will evaluate the Proposed Rules with a focus upon their
procedural highlights. The limitations of this article,' 5 as well as its
purpose, can only be understood in terms of the conclusions which the
authors have reached: that the Proposed Rules are a good start on
a basic working document; 16 that an expanded, broad-based, advisory
committee needs to work over the Rules, revise and expand them, and
to incorporate comments; 17 and that final adoption of the Rules must
be delayed for several months to let this be accomplished."
II. THE PROPOSED RULES-PRELIMiNARY
CONSIDERATIONS
The Judicial Council derives its rule-making authority from the Cali-
fornia Constitution, article VI, section 6, which authorizes the Judicial
4. Id.
5. Id. See discussion in text at notes 173-80 infra for the Judicial Council's actions
subsequent to the writing of this article.
6. Id. at vii-viii.
7. Id. at viii.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at ix.
11. Id.
12. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 600 (West 1972).
13. PRoPosED RuLES, supra note 2, at ix.
14. Id. at x.
15. Since the article is intended to make a case for detailed review by a broad based
committee, it becomes unnecessary to attempt to find every defect or omission in the
Rules; the authors make no claim to have done so. The Rules became available for
comment in late June of 1976; the comment deadline of October 1, 1976, does not per-.
mit complete analysis.
16. See text accompanying notes.42 infra.
17. See notes 29-42 infra and accompanying text.
18. See note 46 infra and accompanying text.
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Council to "adopt rules for court administration, practice and proce-
dure, not inconsistent with statute, and perform other functions pre-
scribed by statute."' 9 This authority is made mandatory by the Arnold-
Kennick Juvenile Court Law as originally enacted in 1961 .20 It pro-
vides that "It]he Judicial Council shall establish rules governing prac-
tice and procedure in the juvenile court not inconsistent with law.
21
That mandatory provision, 22 never implemented, still remains in full
force and effect.
In spite of this explicit and mandatory authority there has been a
fifteen year delay in promulgation of the Rules. The cause of the delay
rests primarily in the ancient maxim of life that "the wheel that squeaks
the loudest is the one that gets the grease." The reality is that the
low-profile juvenile justice system has not, until recently, done much
squeaking. Participants in the system often have little to gain by sub-
stituting uniformity of procedure for systems which function to their
satisfaction in their respective spheres. A combination of public indiffer-
ence, indifference on the part of the bench and the bar, funding prob-
lems and questions of priorities contributed to the delay. 28
19. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1974).
20. Stats. 1961, c. 1616, p. 3459, § 2, codified at CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN.
§ 500-945 (West 1972).
21. CAL. WELF. & INST'Ns CODE ANN. § 570 (West 1972) (emphasis added).
The Arnold-Kennick Juvenile Court Law, CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 500-
945 (West 1972) was adopted following a two year study by the Governor's Special
Study Commission on Juvenile Justice. The Commission was authorized to
study, evaluate and make recommendations respecting all matters related to juvenile
justice and the protection of minors together with dependent children, minor of-
fenders against the law including their apprehension, detention, prosecution, super-
vision, treatment, and rehabilitation.
First Interim Report of the Special Study Committee on Juvenile Justice, appendix A
at 30 (Feb. 2, 1959).
A quick perusal of CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. H9 500-945 (West 1972) dem-
onstrates that the law is essentially devoid of procedural guidelines. See, e.g., id. §§
630.1 (notice to counsel), 634.5 (appointment of counsel).
22. CAL. WELF. & INST'Ns CODE ANN. § 15 (West 1972) provides that "shall" is man-
datory.
23. The official explanation is contained in the introduction to the Proposed Rules:
Due to insufficient staff and other priorities which developed within the judicial
system, the Judicial Council in the past has been unable to act effectively in promul-
gating rules relating to the juvenile courts. The availability of federal funds, how-
ever, made possible the necessary staffing for the Juvenile Court Rules Project on a
full-time basis. In January 1975, Chief Justice Donald R. Wright, Chairman of
the Judicial Council, appointed a project advisory committee to assist the Council in
developing proposed juvenile court rules.
PROPOSED RuLEs, supra note 2, at vi.
The following is a somewhat more detailed explanation. Between 1961 and 1967,
lawyers in California seldom appeared in the juvenile court. Since each county operated
its own system which became well known to those who participated in it, those in the
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The present significance of the past delay is that the system has man-
aged to survive without rules, however difficult that may have been.
Further delay can be tolerated by the system if that delay is necessary
in order that rules of the highest quality are produced. The process
of adoption requires all deliberate speed, not unseemly haste.
The Rules have been put together by an Advisory Committee con-
sisting of six superior court judges and two full-time juvenile court ref-
erees.24 All of the judges have extensive juvenile court experience.
The Chairman is the leading California judicial writer in the area.25
Some of the judges were not actively involved in juvenile court matters
during the time they were on the Committee.26  Both referees were
involved in the juvenile court on a full-time basis. Staff attorneys from
the Administrative Office of the Courts have been used to provide staff-
ing for the project.
system felt no pressing need for rules. Indeed, rules represented a potential threat since
invariably some changes in local practice would be required. No real pressure existed
to adopt rules.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), handed down May 15, 1967, caused a revolution in
the juvenile court. As applied to California, Gault was not in fact that revolutionary.
The real revolution was in the 1961 law. See Boches, Juvenile Justice in California:
A Re-evaluation, 19 HAST. L.J. 47 (1967). But the publicity surrounding Gault caused
the Legislature, the Bar, and the general public to assume that lawyers belonged in the
juvenile court system. See Milton, Post-Gault: A Prospectus for the Juvenile Court,
16 N.Y.L.F. 57 (1970). The lawyers came, the need for procedure followed, and the
necessity of having holes in the law filled by appellate court decisions when procedural
rules would have avoided the problems, put on more pressure to develop rules. See, e.g.,
In re Edgar M., 14 Cal. 3d 727, 537 P.2d 406, 122 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1975); Joe Z. v.
Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 797, 478 P.2d 26, 91 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1970); Neil G. v.
Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 572, 106 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1973).
Sometime prior to 1970, the Judicial Council began to gear up to work on juvenile
court rules. Suddenly the Legislature enacted the Family Law Act, CAL. Civ.
CODE § 4000 et seq. (West 1970), and rules for it were required. Adults seek-
ing dissolution of marriage and their lawyers are a far more powerful lobby than
juveniles. The work on juvenile rules was set aside, and thereafter not taken up because
of a lack of funds. See PROPOSED RuLEs, supra note 2, at vi.
Enter the Committee on Juvenile Justice of the State Bar of California. Dissatisfied
with the long delay in rule preparation, the Committee in 1973 transmitted a request
to the Board of Governors of the State Bar of California that the Board strongly urge
the Judicial Council to prepare and promulgate Rules; the Board did so.
By the summer of 1974, the Judicial Council had been moved to seek and obtain a
grant to prepare rules from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and the
California Office of Criminal Justice Planning. Federal grants were obtained and work
finally began. See PROPOSED RULES, supra note 2, at ii, vi.
24. See PROPOSED RULES, supra note 2, at iii.
25. Judge Homer B. Thompson, author of JUvENILE COURT DESKBOOK (1972).
26. E.g. Judge Hogoboom, who left the Juvenile Court bench on January 1, 1975, to
become Assistant Presiding Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, and Judge Carkeet,
who is retired.
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The introduction to the Rules suggests that comments on the Pro-
posed Rules as drafted were obtained only from judges and referees
prior to tentative adoption." It seems fair to assume that the Proposed
Rules were reviewed by few other persons.
The basic approach of the draftsmen, including a statement of goals,
is described in the introduction to the Proposed Rules:
[T]he advisory committee identified two major objectives of the Juvenile
Court Rules Project: (1) to encourage greater uniformity in applying
the juvenile court law in the several counties, and (2) to provide guid-
ance to juvenile court judges and referees and to attorneys, probation
officers and social workers appearing in the juvenile court. To accom-
plish those goals, the committee attempted to develop a model set of
court rules within the basic scheme of the present juvenile court law.
The framework of the proposed rules is a contextual restatement of
existing statutory provisions as interpreted by case law. To the extent
the statutes may now be misleading, confusing, or ambiguous, an effort
was made ... to clarify their intent. In those area where little pro-
cedural guidance exists in the statutes, it has been provided.28
Unfortunately the Rules reflect these relatively limited objectives.
Note that the two major objectives have been defined by the authors
of the Rules and the Advisory Committee as (i) to encourage greater
uniformity, and (ii) to provide guidance to the participants in the sys-
tem. The authors take issue with a priority system which does not con-
sider the administration of justice to all parties before the court as the
primary objective.
III. A PERSPECTIVE ON THE UNDERLYING PROBLEMS
Basic errors in the Committee composition and approach have caused
the underlying problems of the Rules. The narrow composition of the
Advisory Committee has given rise to fundamental difficulties. As men-
tioned previously, its members are all superior court judges, or referees of
the juvenile court.2" There is no representation of the other participants
27. The PNoPosED RuLES state:
The advisory committee met almost every month for more than a year to complete
a tentative draft for dissemination to participants attending the March 1976 Juvenile
Court Institute. At the Institute, comments regarding the draft were obtained from
juvenile court judges and referees before the proposed rules were submitted to the
Judicial Council. Generally, the participants were very receptive to the proposed
rules, both as to content and format. At the same time, several constructive sugges-
tions were made for clarifying or otherwise improving the proposed rules, many of
which were incorporated into the proposed rules.
PROPOSED RULES, supra note 2, at vii.
28. PROPosED RULES, supra note 2, at vii.
29. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
Contrast the composition of the following committees. The Advisory Committee
"6CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURT RULES
in the juvenile justice system: appellate court judges, district attorneys
and county counsel, public defenders and the private defense bar, proba-
tion officers and social workers, law enforcement officers, school offi-
cials, or psychiatrists and psychologists. Additionally, there is no repre-
sentation of those who come before the court: mainly the poor, 0 or the
public in general. Thus, initially, the Rules must be viewed as the prod-
uct of trial court judges.
To compound the problem, the Advisory Committee is not even rep-
resentative of the juvenile court bench. All members of the Commit-
tee are male; no woman judge or referee serves on it. Of the eight
members,3 1 three come from counties having a population under
200,00032 and only two come from large urban counties.33  Most major
urban counties-San Diego, San Francisco, Alameda, Sacramento and
Fresno-excepting Los Angeles are unrepresented.
Given the composition of the Advisory Committee, it is hardly sur-
prising that the primary purposes of the Rules are defined so narrowly.
34
Promoting uniformity in operation and providing guidance for those en-
gaged in the system are laudable objectives. They are objectives par-
ticularly suited to consideration by a state-wide committee consisting
solely of trial judges. But they are far too narrow in scope, and ignore
for the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE consists of two senior circuit judges,
three circuit judges, two senior United States district court judges, three United
States district court judges and six practicing attorneys. FEDERAL RULES at XI (West
Publishing Co. 1975).
The Advisory Committee for the FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE consists
of one senior circuit judge, three circuit judges, three United States district court judges,
two associate justices (both retired), one professor of law, two practicing attorneys, and
the Director of the Federal Defender Program, Inc. FEDERAL RULES at XIII (West
Publishing Co. 1975).
30. PRESMENT's CoMMrSSION oN LAw ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JusTicE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 55-77 (1967).
31. The counties from which the eight members are drawn and the populations as of
April 1, 1970 are as follows:
(a) Los Angeles County 7,036,987
(b) Santa Clara County 1,066,714
(c) San Bernardino County 681,535
(d) Ventura County 378,497
(e) Santa Barbara County 264,324
(f) Tulare County 188,322
(g) Butte County 101,969
(h) Tuolomne County " 22,169
CAL. DEPT. OF HEALTH, VITAL STATISTICS OF CALIFORNIA 9 (1971).
32. Hon. Ross A. Carkeet (Tuolumne County); Hon. Jean Morony (Butte County);
Hon. Leonard M. Ginsburg (Tulare County).'
33. Hon. Homer B. Thompson (Santa Clara County); Hon. William P. Hogoboom
(Los Angeles County).
34. See text accompanying note 36 infra.
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broader concepts such as the doing of justice,35 making the system seem
fair to those enmeshed in it, 6 and minimizing delay and appeals.
The trial judge composition of the Advisory Committee also explains
why "[t]he framework of the proposed Rules is a contextual restate-
ment of the existing statutory provisions as interpreted by case law. '37
Trial judges function within the framework of existing law and have
a natural urge to codify it in its existing form. Such an approach
is particularly unwise in the juvenile justice system where existing case
law has developed poorly and in a haphazard fashion.38 Had the Com-
mittee included a supreme court justice, one might have expected some
thrust to expand the law.89  Those who devote their time to defense
of juveniles might have been inclined to focus on elements of the sys-
tem which have the greatest practical effect on their clients, such as
provisions relating to pre-trial detention. Probation officers, psychia-
trists and psychologists might have focused primarily on aspects which
most markedly affected rehabilitation. However, nowhere in the Rules
35. Sir Frederick Pollock asserts that the law presupposes ideas of justice. F. POL-
LOCK, JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL ESSAYS (1961).
36. It has been noted that:
Unless appropriate due process of law is followed, even the juvenile who has
violated the law may not feel that he is being fairly treated and may therefore resist
the rehabilitative efforts of court personnel.
S. WHEELER & L. COTTRELL, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY-ITS PREVENTION AND CONTROL
.'33 (1966) cited in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967).
37. PROPOSED RULES, supra note 2, at vi.
38. Much of the interpretation of statutory law has been the direct result of the lack
of rules to fill the gap. As the Supreme Court stated:
The absence of procedural rules based upon constitutional principle has not
always produced fair, efficient and effective procedures.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967).
Almost invariably the interpreting court has been acting in a narrow context, on a
piecemeal basis, without any particular attempt to consider how a given interpretation
will fit into the overall scheme of the law, and without reaching a conclusion which nec-
essarily precludes some other approach by means of rules. See, e.g., Joe Z. v. Superior
Court,'3 Cal. 3d 797, 478 P.2d 26, 91 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1970); In re Dennis H., 19 Cal.
App. 3d 350, 96 Cal. Rptr. 791 (1971); In re Larry W., 16 Cal. App. 3d 290, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 31 (1971).
By cloosing. the approach of simply restating the law with little change, the
staff and the Advisory Committee have followed an inertia approach. This approach
accounts in large measure for many of the defects of the Proposed Rules and for their
overall lack of creativity.
39. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1968), where the California Supreme Court eliminated certain status limitations on
negligence liability over Justice Burke's objection in dissent that
[s]weeping modifications of tort liability law fall more suitably within the domain
of the Legislature ....
Id. at 121, 443 P.2d at 569, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 105 (dissenting opinion). See also Dillon
v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (the court threw out
the restrictive "zone of danger" test as previously applied to the standing issue).
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is there a desire to boldly determine what changes are required in the
juvenile justice system, or to struggle with the question of whether the
desired changes can properly be made -through rule-making.
The nature of the Advisory Committee also explains its apparent
consensus. Since the members all are drawn from one source, namely
the trial bench, it is hardly surprising that the comments to the Rules
reflect neither debate, dissent, nor consideration of statutes or rules of
other jurisdictions. Rather than serving to substantially advance the
state of juvenile justice in California, the result is a set of Rules so
bland as to be little more than the existing mess of pottage codified.40
The final impact of having a committee consisting solely of trial
judges lies in the procedures contemplated for adoption of the Rules.
Here, the last chance for balance was missed. The Committee chose
to reveal the Proposed Rules only to the juvenile court judges and ref-
erees of the State and to obtain only their comments before formally
submitting the Rules to the Judicial Council for tentative approval.41
True, public comments now are being sought. However, the process of
obtaining public comments, which were due by October 1, 1976,42 all
but precludes careful and deliberate consideration by the Judicial Coun-
cil of anything but "omitted comma" type comments unless the entire
timetable is rolled back.
IV. METHOD AND APPROACH TO ANALYSIS
OF THE RULES
The following analysis of the Rules has two objectives. The primary
objective is to demonstrate that large areas of significance have not
been appropriately handled and that, as a result, promulgation of the
Rules ought to be delayed until a broad-based committee has thrashed
out those issues. In most instances the problems arise from the failure
of the Advisory Committee to do anything more than attempt to codify
40. The authors claim no great familiarity with juvenile court practices in the small
rural counties of California. Perhaps the members of the Advisory Committee, most
of whom come from smaller counties, see the changes as a significant advancement in
favor of delinquents and allegedly neglectful parents. From the vantage point of those
practicing in Los Angeles County and accustomed to practice in other large counties,
this simply is not so.
41. PROPosED RuLEs, supra note 2, at v.
According to Karl J. Uebel, Project Counsel, a few non-judges were present at the
Juvenile Court Institute, and a copy of the Proposed Rules was released to the Chairman
of the State Bar Committee on Juvenile Justice in April of 1976. Nevertheless, it seems
clear there was no widespread effort to obtain comment from the Bar or other non-
judges on the Rules as drafted prior to tentative adoption.
42. PRoPOsED RULES, supra note 2, at v.
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existing law, or are the result of simply avoiding issues and leaving
them unresolved. A secondary objective is to point out a variety of
areas where the Rules need further work. The problems range from
the serious to the very technical, thereby supporting the proposition
that delay in promulgation of the Rules is required for correction.
V. ILLUSTRATIVE INTEGRATED ANALYSIS-RULE S DEALING WITH
DETENTION HEARING INVOLVING ALLEGED DELINQUENCIES
A. Introduction and Method of Approach
This section will analyze the rules dealing with the pre-trial detention
of minors in delinquency cases. This area has been selected because
excessive pre-trial detention of delinquents, for whom bail is not pres-
ently available,48 represents one of the most troubled areas of the juve-
nile justice process in California4 4 and in the United States." Rather
than analyzing the Rules in the subchapter one by one, they will be
analyzed as a whole.
B. Analysis of the Existing Situation and the
Functioning of the Rules
A minor accused of being pre-delinquent 6 or delinquent47 usually
has first contact with a peace officer.48  The officer may release
the minor, have the minor and his parent sign a notice to appear
before the probation officer, and then release the minor, or "take
such minor without unnecessary delay before the probation officer." 40
In determining which alternative to follow "the officer shall prefer the
alternative which least restricts the minor's freedom of movement, pro-
vided such alternative is compatible with the best interest of the minor
and the community."5
The system rarely functions in strict accordance with the statute. A
minor interfaces with a peace officer in the field. The officer decides
to release, or to cite, or brings the minor into the station for further
43. In re William M., 3 Cal. 3d 16, 473 P.2d 737, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970).
44. See notes 95-97 infra and accompanying text.
45. PREsiDmTs COMMSSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINaSRAoTI0N op Jus-
TICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 55-77 (1967).
46. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 601 (West Supp. 1976).
47. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 602 (West 1972).
48. Boches, Juvenile Justice in California: A Re-Evaluation, 19 HAST. L.J. 47, 49
(1967).
49. CAL. Wh.x. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 626 (West 1972).
50. Id.
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interrogation.51 Other informal procedures, not contemplated by the
law, may be followed.52 Taking the time to thoroughly interrogate the
minor is viewed as necessary delay. In rural areas considerable delay
may occur before a vehicle is available to transport the minor to the
juvenile hall. At juvenile hall the minor is again interrogated by a pro-
bation officer. While the probation officer is directed to file a petition
"immediately"s upon determining that "the minor shall be retained in
custody," 4 in fact the petition normally is not filed until the end of
the 48-hour time limit." The reality of that limit is that a minor taken
into custody at 1:00 a.m. on Saturday is not "filed on" until some time
on the following Tuesday, with a detention hearing on Wednesday. If
Monday were a holiday, the petition could be filed on Wednesday and
the hearing held on Thursday. If the minor demands that a prima facie
case be put on, the hearing may be continued for three judicial days,
and for up to five judicial days if a material witness is unavailable.56
1. Interrogation by the Officer in the Field
In order -for the officer to interrogate the minor in the field, either
the minor must waive his right against self-incrimination,5r or there
must be some privilege preventing use of 'the information so revealed
against the minor, thereby making waiver unnecessary.5s The simple
fact of the matter is -that minors generally do not understand their right
to remain silent, and even if they do, they will nevertheless talk.5"
51. Id.
52. In one rural town in Fresno County a few years ago, youths involved in minor
offenses were set to work washing squad cars on Saturday mornings. In May of
1976, a member of a Los Angeles County law enforcement agency stated to one of the
authors: 'Tve given up bringing in minors whom I find possessing marijuana. It
doesn't do any good. So I just make them eat it. I enjoy watching them spill out their
guts on the ground."
53. CAL. WELF. & INsT'NS CODE ANN. § 630 (West Supp. 1976).
There is no clarification in the code of how much time the term "immediately" allows
the probation officer before he must either file the petition or release the minor.
54. Id.
55. CAL. WELF. & fINST'NS CODE ANN. § 631 (West 1972).
This time limit excludes any non-judicial days. Non-judicial days are Saturdays, Sun-
days and legal holidays.
56. CAr.. WELF. & INsT'Ns CODE ANN. § 637 (West Supp. 1976); PROPOSED RifLEs,
supra note 2, Rule 1336(c).
57. CAr.. WELv. & INsT'NS CODE ANN. § 625 (West 1972).
58. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1109 (Supp. 1976).
59. Despite the general lack of understanding on the part of minors, those who have
been through the system once-particularly those who have learned that their ill-advised
statements directly resulted in a case being made against them-are learning. More and
19761
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Certainly no compentent attorney would permit a minor to speak
to law enforcement officers until counsel has had the opportunity to
talk to the minor. The law ought to provide the unrepresented minor
with the protections competent counsel would provide.
The easiest answer is to. provide that no admission or confession
made by a minor in the absence of his attorney and not joined in by
the attorney shall be admissible against the minor. Such a provision
is not without precedent. 60 Nor is it without strong rational justifica-
tion. The juvenile court stands in loco parentis to the minor. 1  The
only justification for permitting widespread waiver is the belief that
minors should not be permitted to exercise their constitutional rights
if such action can be avoided. If the minor were provided counsel at
the time of apprehension, counsel surely would screen, if not prevent,
statements. The law should do the same indirectly.
If waivers are to be permitted, at least a revised standard form of
the Miranda warning should be required as a condition of admissibility.
First, the warning should be put into language which is more likely to
be understandable by the minor.6" Secondly, the minor should be ad-
vised of the right to consult with a parent, as well as an attorney, before
deciding to waive his rights.'
2. Delivery by the Police Officer to the Probation Officer
The law requires the police officer to take a minor who is to be de-
more law enforcement agencies in Los Angeles County complain that minors have
learned to say nothing. But see Ferguson & Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7
SAN D CoO L. REv. 39 (1970):
Generally, delinquents consciously know they have a right to remain silent.
Nonetheless, 29% of the delinquents felt they had to talk to police when arrested
(question a). Apparently knowledge is often subordinate to mental state at the
time of arrest confrontation. Perhaps the difference between knowledge of the
right to silence and subjective feeling of a necessity to talk is explained by the
findings that 60% felt it would go against them if they remained silent (question
b); 74% felt it would benefit them to talk (question c), and 55% were told by the
arresting officer that it would be better for them to talk (question d).
Id. at 51.
60. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. AwN. tit. 10, § 1109 (Supp. 1976).
61. See Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 I-AIv. L. REV. 104, 119-120 (1909); Paulsen,
Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. Gr.
Rv. 167, 174.
62. In the case of In re Dennis M., 70 Cal. 2d 444, 450 P.2d 296, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1969), the California Supreme Court recommended that "juvenile officers and police
be prepared to give their compulsory Miranda warning in terms that reflect the language
and experience of today's juveniles." Id. at 464 n.13, 450 P.2d at 308 n.13, 75 Cal.
Rptr. at 13 n.13.
63. See, e.g., Or.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1109 (Supp. 1976).
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tained to the probation officer "without unnecessary delay." 4 Unneces-
sary delay is undefined. Input and assistance from peace officers and
probation officers is needed to determine how much time reasonably is
needed, but a period four hours from the time the minor is taken into
custody would not seem unreasonable. Exceptions are required for
cases in which the officer is prepared to release the minor to a parent
as soon as one can be found and in cases where the officer is prepared
to release the minor as soon as his physical condition (i.e., sobriety,
degree of influence from drugs) will reasonably permit.
Taking the minor to the probation officer involves more than deliver-
ing the warm body of one juvenile. The probation officer has an obli-
gation to investigate, 65 something which is impossible to do if the minor
is delivered by a transportation officer who knows nothing of the case
and brings no police report with him. Law enforcement should be re-
quired to either bring with them a complete arrest report or to have
the minor transported by an officer having knowledge of the facts who
can and should be required to complete a report at the time the minor
is delivered.
3. Having a Probation Officer Available
Having the officer deliver the minor to a probation officer is of little
value if in fact there is no probation officer available to immediately
investigate. This is not as acute a problem in major metropolitan coun-
ties as it is in smaller counties. The Rules should require that a proba-
tion officer be on duty or on call at all hours of the day and night to
investigate the cases of minors who are detained.
4. Ability of Judge or Referee to Order Release
At the present time there is no convenient provision allowing judges
and referees to order the release of detained juveniles from custody
prior to the filing of a petition or the holding of a detention hearing.
The Rules could easily establish such provisions. These provisions
would not impinge on the rights of the probation officer. Under exist-
ing law, relief can already be sought by means of a writ of habeas
corpus accompanied by an application for warrant of arrest.
66
64. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 626(c) (West 1972).
65. Id. § 628(a).
66. ee CAL. C oNST, art. 1, § 11 (1974); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1501 (West 1970).
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5. Speeding Up Detention Hearings
At present, the greatest gap in the detention process is the long de-
lay between being taken into custody and the holding of the detention
hearing, if maximum time deadlines are utiilzed. In many cases
minors are apprehended on the weekend, and the minor who is appre-
hended early Saturday can be held for hearing until Tuesday; or if ap-
prehended on a holiday weekend, can be held for hearing until the fol-
lowing Wednesday.67  While Rule 1321(b) reiterates the existing law
in requiring the probation officer to immediately file the petition, Rule
1321(a) retains the forty-eight hour rule. Therefore, nothing in this
Rule can be expected to change existing practice. 8
The problem is not one of more time being required for investiga-
tion; rather, the problem is a combination of probation department in-
ertia and understaffing coupled with the widespread idea that all one
need do is to comply with the forty-eight hour requirement.
A number of distinct and independent suggestions that might be in-
corporated into the Rules to solve the problem are: (1) Rewrite Rules
1321(a) and 1321(b) to place major emphasis on the duty to immedi-
ately investigate and file, rather than on the forty-eight hour limit; (2)
permit -the filing of handwritten detained petitions so that filing delays
will not result from the inability to find typists; (3) require every petition
to be filed within twenty-four hours of -the date and hour on which the
minor is received (non-judicial days included) by the probation officer
in the absence of extreme good cause; (4) require the probation officer
to immediately advise by telephone a designated judge or referee of the
juvenile court and the Public Defender when a minor has been de-
tained for more than twenty-four hours without a petition being filed;
67. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
68. Serious constitutional problems are presented. In the case of In re William M.,
3 Cal. 3d 16, 473 P.2d 737, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970), the California Supreme Court
stated that:
The California Juvenile Court Law, as properly administered, provides an adequate
system for the prehearing release of juveniles without the requirement of posting
bail. ... Hence, we decline to consider whether juveniles are constitutionally en-
titled to bail.
Id. at 26 n.17, 473 P.2d at 744 n.17, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 40 n.17 (emphasis added) (cita-
tions omitted).
That case involved post-detention hearing release, not pre-detention hearing release.
An adult is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. If the present scheme
of pre-detention hearing for juveniles can be justified at all, it can be justified only if
it operates quickly at the hands of the probation officer and is followed by immediato
judicial review,
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and (5) require the office of the county clerk to be open during reason-
able hours of the weekend so that petitions can conveniently be filed.
All of these suggestions necessarily involve inconvenience and more
work for existing personnel in the system. However, it is very easy
to forget that the system is run for the benefit of the youth which it
serves. There is a certain irony in the fact that commissioners are on
duty throughout the weekend in Los Angeles County to reduce bail
or release adult offenders on their own recognizance,8 9 while young-
sters languish in juvenile halls awaiting the arrival of the work week
and the return of judicial personnel to the courthouse.
C. The Initial Detention Hearing
The concept advanced by the Proposed Rules of an initial detention
hearing followed by a rehearing" is not new, however, the terminology
is.
1. Explanation of Proceedings
Rule 1324(a) provides for an elaborate explanation of the minor's
rights and a reading of the petition at the beginning of the detention
hearing. These formalities customarily are abbreviated when the
minor is already represented by counsel. Specific provisions should be
made to permit waiver if the minor's counsel assures the court that the
necessary explanations have already been given. If the Rules are in-
tended to absolutely prohibit waiver then they should explicitly provide
for this result.
2. Right to Counsel
Rule 1324(b) and 1324(c) do nothing more than restate the law
relating to the appointment and waiver of right to appointment of coun-
sel.71 The Rule is woefully insufficient. It is hard to imagine any case
in which a minor could prudently waive the right to counsel if the case
is so serious as to merit the possibility of detention. Given that the
parents, if able, may resist -the idea of being required to reimburse the
county72 and the lack of knowledge on which a minor can draw to make
69. Los ANGELES COUNTY SuPEn. Cr. R. 18 § 3.
70. PRoPosED RuL..s, supra note 2, Rule 1326(c). For the text of the rule, see note
81 infra.
71. CAL. WEix. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 634 (West 1972).
72. See id. § 903.1; People v. Amor, 12 Cal. 3d 20, 523 P.2d 1173, 114 Cal. Rptr.
765 (1974). Section 903.1 indicates that parents are liable for legal costs and Amor
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an intelligent decision, the Rules ought to provide that, in at least all
detained cases, the minor cannot waive his right to counsel unless the
minor has first conferred with counsel and counsel joins in the waiver
or .the minor otherwise convinces -the court that he is capable of handling
his own defense.
3. Evidence at the Original Detention Hearing
It is clear from Welfare and Institutions Code section 635 that at the
original detention hearing the court must hear "such relevant evidence
as -the minor ... desires to present . . . ." However, Rule 1323 re-
stricts such evidence to that which is relevant to the grounds for deten-
tion of the minor. Further weighing the scales against the minor and
on the side of detention is Rule 1326(b). This Rule allows the court,
in finding the prerequisites of detention, to rely solely on written police
reports, probation reports or other documents submitted by the proba-
tion officer. At this stage the minor is not given an opportunity to con-
front the preparers of such documents unless his defense counsel has
had the unusual good fortune of adequate time and resources to subpoena
them.
Assume that through the diligence of counsel the minor has pres-
ent at the detention hearing all known witnesses to the event in
question, including the victim and the arresting officer. It must be
maintained that, under those circumstances, the minor is free to put
these witnesses on the stand to show that he should not be detained
because there is no probable cause to believe that he committed the
offense in question. Consider another situation. The minor offers
three alibi witnesses. The court must hear them, 'but according to
the Rules their testimony goes only to the issue of detention. The Court
should balance their testimony against any hearsay statements con-
tained in the report of the police officer and decide whether to dis-
miss the petition. Now take a third example. Assume that the mi-
nor is the only witness to testify. He concedes the truth of every-
thing in the police report involving an entry into a school. His only
claim is that he saw the door blowing in the wind, entered the school-
yard to fasten it shut, and, as he was about to do so, was grabbed by a
peace officer. The court should consider this testimony even though
it goes to the allegations rather than to the issue of detention.
establishes the constitutionality of a similar provision in CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.8 (West
1970).
73. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 635 (West 1972).
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Rule 1323(a) must be revised to make it clear that testimony of-
fered by the minor which goes directly and unequivocally to the issue
of probable cause for detention is to be heard at the initial detention
hearing. Rules 1323(b) and 1326(b) also need to be revised to ex-
plicitly allow for such evidence.
4. Continuing the Detention Hearing for a Rehearing
Rule 1326(c) permits the minor to confront "preparers of reports
or documents relied on by -the court"'74 in ordering detention. This
confrontation takes place at what now is styled as a detention "rehear-
ing," the purpose of which is to establish whether a prima facie case
can be made to show the minor is a person described by Welfare and
Institutions Code sections 60111 or 602.70 In accordance with law,
77
the detention rehearing is held within three judicial days of the date
of the original detention hearing, with an additional continuance of five
judicial days if the witnesses are unavailable.
The first defect of this Rule is that it places no stress on holding the
hearing as quickly as possible. There is no reason to always allow the
three day delay (which is the most convenient for court calendaring)
if the witnesses are in fact available the day following the original hear-
ing. Availability normally could readily be determined by the District
Attorney or probation officer telephoning the persons in question on
the spot.
The second defect is in the failure to define the term "unavailable."
The term needs definition to eliminate excuses such as "the officer will
be on vacation" or "the officer is out of the county on business." "Un-
availability" should 'have precise meaning, such as the one provided in
the California Evidence Code.
7 8
74. PROPOSED RuLEs, supra note 2, Rule 1326(c).
75. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CoDE ANN. § 601 (West Supp. 1976).
76. Id. § 602.
77. Id. § 637. Under the Rules the five judicial day period is calculated from the
date of the initial detention hearing, not from the date of the detention rehearing. PRo-
PosED RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1326(c). This interpretation is very much to the favor
of the minor.
78. CAL. EvID. CODE § 240 (West 1966) defines "unavailable as a witness":
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (b), "unavailable as a witness"
means that the declarant is:
1. Exempted or precluded on the ground of privilege from testifying concern-
ing the matter to which his statement is relevant;
2. Disqualified from testifying to the matter;
3. Dead or unable to attend or to testify at the hearing because of then
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity;
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5. Evidence at the Detention Hearing
The Rules provide that at the rehearing the minor shall have the
right to examine "preparers of reports or documents relied upon by the
court in support of its initial decision.""Th This strips the rehearing
provisions of all meaning. This effect is best understood by an example.
Assume that Officers A and B are summoned by a householder who
reports having seen a burglar try to enter his home. The officers
scour the neighborhood, find a likely suspect, and transport ,the sus-
pect back to the householder, -who identifies the minor. Cross-ex-
amination of Officers A and B is useless since they have personal
knowledge only of the hearsay statement by the alleged victim. The
petitioner should have the burden of producing in court the maker of
the statement for examination by the minor's counsel. Even worse,
assume that Officers A and B orally transmit the information to Offi-
cer C, who in turn prepares the written report submitted to the
court. The cross-examination of Officer C, whose statements are dou-
ble level hearsay, is more than useless since he has no personal knowl-
edge of anything, and cannot even testify -as to the demeanor of the
complainant.
Rule 1326(b) (allowing the court to base detention on written doc-
uments) 0 and Rule 1326(c) (limiting cross-examination to the pre-
parers of the document) 81 assertedly encompass case law governing the
4. Absent from the hearing and the court is unable to compel his attendance
by its process; or
5. Absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has exercised
reasonable diligence but has been unable to procure his attendance by the court's
process.
(b) A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, preclusion,
disqualification, death, inability, or absence of the declarant was brought about by
the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement for the purpose
of preventing the declarant from attending or testifying.
Id,
79. PROPOSED RuLEs, supra note 2, Rule 1326(c). For the text of the rule, see note
81 infra.
80. PRoPosED RuLEs, supra note 2, Rule 1326(b) states:
In making the findings prerequisite to an order of detention at the detention hear-
ing, the court may rely solely upon written police reports, probation reports or
other documents submitted by the probation officer.
Id.
81. PROPOSED RULEs, supra note 2, Rule 1326(c) states:
After a decision of detention has been made, the minor or the minor's counsel
may request further evidence regarding the prima facie case or the grounds of de-
tention by invoking the right to confront and to cross-examine the preparers of
reports or documents relied upon by the court in support of its initial decision. If
that request is made, a rehearing shall be held within three judicial days to con-
sider testimony by those persons. If the rehearing cannot be held within three
judicial days due to the unavailability of a witness, the court may continue the
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actual conduct of detention hearings; in reality, they do not. Rather,
they come close to a restatement of the statutory laws2 while ignoring
the case law. As will be shown, the law as correctly interpreted re-
quires that upon demand, the petitioner must produce at a detention
rehearing sufficient live or otherwise admissible testimony -to establish
a prima facie case against the minor.
In the case of In re William M.8 8 the Supreme Court of California
stated that
the Legislature has now clearly indicated that the probation officer,
at the detention hearing, is charged with the duty of adducing facts
which will support detention under Section 636.84
The court then cites with approval the statement of one of the authors
that "[tihis requirement for full evidentiary hearings .. . should, in
and of itself, do more than anything else to remedy California's over-
detention practices."8' 5 It should be obvious that the salutory objective
of full evidentiary hearings cannot be accomplished when the officer
who prepares the report and who testifies does not in fact have first-
hand knowledge of the underlying facts contained in the report, and
is instead a hearsay declarant offering hearsay. 6
In the case of In re Dennis H.8 7 the court characterized the case of
rehearing for a period not to exceed five judicial days from commencement of the
detention hearing. If the preparer of any report or document is not made available
for purposes of confrontation and cross-examination by the minor, the report or
document shall not be considered by the court in making its detention decision.
Id.
82. See CAL. WELF. & INsT'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 635-36 (West 1972); id. § 637 (West
Supp. 1976).
83. 3 Cal. 3d 16, 473 P.2d 737, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970).
84. Id. at 28, 473 P.2d at 745, '89 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 636 (West 1972) states:
If it appears upon the hearing that such minor has violated an order of the juve-
nile court or has escaped from a commitment of the juvenile court or that it is a
matter of immediate and urgent necessity for the protection of such minor or the
person or property of another that he be detained or that such minor is likely to
flee the jurisdiction of the court, the court may make its order that such minor be
detained in the juvenile hal or other suitable place designated by the juvenile court
for a period not to exceed 15 judicial days and shall enter said order together with
its findings of fact in support thereof in the records of the court.
Id.
85. In re William M., 3 Cal. 3d 16, 28 n.20, 473 P.2d 737, 745-46 n.20, 89 Cal. Rptr.
33, 41-2 n.20 (1970), quoting Boches, Juvenile Justice in California: A Re-Evaluation,
19 HAsTiNGs L.J. 47, 49 (1967).
86. This problem did not exist in In re William M., 3 Cal. 3d 16, 473 P.2d 737, 89
Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970) because there the minor was accused of selling marijuana to an
undercover officer who, it may be assumed, was the author of the police report.
87. 19 Cal. App. 3d 350, 96 Cal. Rptr. 791 (1971).
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In re Larry W.11 as holding that documentary evidence might be used
in a detention hearing in place of oral testimony, but that this device
could not be used to deprive the minor of his right to demand physical
presence of the declarants.8 9 The court did not have occasion to pass
on whether a demand could properly have been made of the petitioner
for production of the victim since the public defender only demanded
to confront the maker of the police report. Certainly, the court did
not hold that there was no obligation on the petitioner to produce first-
hand witnesses if that was necessary to avoid depriving the minor of his
right to the physical presence of the declarant.
Both Larry W. 9° and a 1975 opinion of the California Attorney Gen-
eral"' reiterate the right of the minor to seek a reasonable continuance
to produce witnesses at the detention hearing. However, both opinions
predate the amendments to the Welfare and Institutions Code which
went into effect in 1976,2 and are premised on the assumption that
the law as constituted simply would not give the probation officer time
to produce witnesses on the day of the detention hearing.03 The
amendments to the Welfare and Institutions Code effective in 1976
provide for continuances for any party to produce witnesses. 4 With
provision now existing for granting the probation officer continuances
there is no reason to interpret the law as placing the burden on the
minor to produce the witnesses.
On the surface, the issue presented is one of who has the burden of
producing witnesses. But the reality of the system is that slight shifts
in administrative convenience significantly affect action. Thus we may
assume that law enforcement officers will exercise far greater restraint
in detaining minors if they know that they will be called upon to help
round up witnesses for the detention hearing. Hard-pressed defense
counsel, generally lacking the necessary resources, are in a poor posi-
tion to corral those witnesses themselves. The District Attorney, Pro-
bation Department, and law enforcement agencies involved have un-
limited resources with which to subpoena necessary witnesses. The
minor is left to the resources of his own counsel's efforts or the regular
88. 16 Cal. App. 3d 290, 94 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1971).
89. In re Dennis H., 19 Cal. App. 3d 350, 355, 96 Cal. Rptr. 791, 794 (1971); see
In re Larry W., 16 Cal. App. 3d 290, 293, 94 Cal. Rptr. 31, 32 (1971).
90. 16 Cal. App. 3d 290, 94 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1971).
91. 58 Op. AT'y GEN. 306 (1975).
92. Stats. 1975, c. 1129, § 1.
93. In re Larry W., 16 Cal. App. 3d 290, 293-94, 94 Cal. Rptr. 31, 32 (1971); 58
Op. AT'y GEN. 306, 309 (1975).
94. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 637 (West Supp. 1976).
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subpoena facilities of the sheriff, marshall or constable. The Civil
Process divisions of the latter agencies normally are not set up to pro-
vide quick service as is required under the circumstances. It therefore
becomes evident that beneath the surface is -the true issue of whether
the court is going to assist or hamper the juvenile in his attempt to
exercise his constitutional right to confrontation and cross-examination
of the witnesses against him.
6. Standards for Detention
California detains three times as many children as the average number
detained by all states. 95 The vague standards for detention established
by Rule 1327 will do little to correct the situation. Rule 1327 is an im-
provement in some areas. It makes it clear that the court has the power
to release the minor in all cases, including -those involving an alleged
violation of a court order.96 But the Rule generally is so vague as to
provide little guidance.17  It would help to preface the Rule with a state-
ment that detention is not favored, that all intendments are against de-
tention, and that doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of release.
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE REMAINING RULES
A. Introduction
This section is intended to deal with problems the Rules present on
a topical basis. The analysis is made with the primary objective of
demonstrating the need for delay in promulgating the Rules, and the
95. CAL. YOUTH AUTHORITY, HIDDEN CLOSETS, A STUDY OF DETENTION PRACTIcES IN
CALIFORNIA 1 (1975).
96. Whereas CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 635 (West 1972) seems to suggest
that the court must detain if the grounds exist, CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. §
636 (West 1972) uses the permissive term "may" and underscores the court's discretion-
ary power to determine, on a case by case basis, whether a minor should be detained.
The Proposed Rules give full recognition to the power of the court in this area. PRO-
PoSED RuLrS, supra note 2, Rule 1327.
97. Certain other problems exist. PROPOSED RULEs, supra note 2, Rule 1327(a) (3)
points to the likelihood of the minor to flee as one factor justifying detention. A
factor in determining whether a minor is likely to flee is whether the minor has a prior
history of failure to obey court orders. Id. Rule 1327(d) (4). There is simply no causal
connection between most such violations and the likelihood of flight. Another factor
in determining likelihood of flight is whether the minor "would probably be released in
an adult court on modest bail". Id. Rule 1327(d) (8). This is an inappropriate factor
in the determination. The correct test is whether the court would release the minor on
normal bail. Modest bail is generally determined by the nature of the offense, not the
likelihood of flight. So, too, in Rule 1327(e) (5) the geographical location of the
residence of the minor bears no causal connection to the protection of the minor.
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secondary objective of providing comments for the benefit of the Judi-
cial Council should they determine to proceed with the promulgation
of Rules.
B. Problems Involving Basic Approach to the Rules
The preliminary provisions"" raise a number of problems. The
greatest problem stems from the decision to accompany the Rules (in
draft form) with comments, while failing to state whether the com-
ments constitute a part of the Rules or whether they will even be
printed with the Rules.19 In some instances possible ambiguities in the
Rules can be resolved only with the benefit of the comments.100 In
other cases the comments can serve to illuminate the meaning of the
Rules.
Another problem presented by the comments stems from their
length. They read more like a committee report than the terse com-
ments one normally would anticipate as an integral part of court rules.
If they are made a part of the Rules then they need to be significantly
condensed.
An additional difficulty grounded in the basic approach to the Rules
is posed by the Advisory Committee's decision to attempt to restate the
law.101 The result, once again, is to unnecessarily elongate the Rules.
98. PRoPosED RuLES, supra note 2, Rule 1301.
99. It is important to define the effect of the Advisory Committee omments in the
Rules. The authors take the position that the comments are not part of the Rules and
therefore there is no need to analyze them. If it is intended that the comments consti-
tute part of the Rules, or are to be an aid in interpretation, the Rules should so provide
and further review would be required.
100. See, e.g., PROPOSED RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1307(b) (1) (c). This Rule seems
to imply that if it appears to the probation officer that sufficient evidence is present to
bring the minor within the jurisdiction of the court and the matter is considered serious,
the probation officer must file a petition. However, upon referral to the corresponding
comment, it becomes evident that the factors suggested in the Rule are not intended to
eliminate the discretion of the probation officer.
See also id. Rule 1309(b) where it is stated that:
Mhe Code of Civil Procedure relating to variance and amendment of pleadings in
civil actions shall apply to petitions and proceedings in the juvenile court ....
Id. Only in the comment thereto is any consideration given to the possible due process
violation which could arise if a minor is detained prior to adjudication beyond the statu-
tory period prescribed by CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 657 (West 1972). The
comment states that
because due process requires that the minor, parent or guardian receive timely notice
of the specific issues to be met at a hearing ... courts should be cautious in per-
mitting an amendment of a petition to conform to proof once a hearing begins ....
PROPOSED RULEs, supra note 2, at 2-22 (citations omitted).
101. PFoPQoEp o .ULED s supra note 2, Rule 1301(c)(1). See, e.g., id. Rule 1308 which
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The practical ramifications are great, since an intensive integration of
the statute into the Rules will create a nightmare as the statutes are re-
vised from time to time and the Rules must be revised accordingly.
It may be that the Advisory Committee elected to incorporate and restate
the statute because it is sufficiently complex that lay probation officers
and social workers practicing before the court 02 need a document which
is better organized than is the statute. If that is the problem, a better
solution would be a separate guide .to the law for those not -trained in it.
An allied problem of approach stems from the fact that the Rules
are not accompanied by mandatory or suggested forms. Often the best
way to illustrate the meaning of a rule and -to guarantee the automatic
compliance with rules as a matter of course, is to build the rules into
forms. Yet no suggested forms have been provided. This unfortunate
oversight needs correction. If the subject of forms had been taken into
account, then the Advisory Committee might have considered the de-
sirability of requiring that certain documents, (i.e., the critical notice
of hearing which is served on the parties along with the petition), con-
tain a notice in Spanish warning of the nature of the proceedings and
the need to take action. It is somewhat ironic to require a warning
in Spanish when a parent faces the loss of his chattels, but none when
the matter at stake is the freedom and custody of his child.
. C. Problems Relating to the Commencement of Proceedings
Proceedings in .the juvenile court are commenced by the probation
officer filing a petition with the clerk of the juvenile court.103 The
process is not a mechanical one. The probation officer has the viable
alternative of not filing a petition, 0 either because he believes that
filing is unwarranted or the evidence is insufficient, or of setting up
a program of voluntary supervision in lieu of filing a petition. 0 5 The
restates CAL. WELF. & INST'Ns CODE ANN. § 650 (West 1972); PRoPosED RuLEs, supra
note 2, Rule 1309(a) which restates CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 626 (West
1972).
102. In many counties, counsel is not present to represent the petitioner in most cases,
and cases are presented in court by the probation officer or social worker. The Rules
purport to provide guidance for "probation officers and others practicing in the juvenile
court." PRoPosED RuLs, supra note 2, Rule 1301(b).
103. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 650 (West 1972).
104. For juvenile court proceedings to commence it takes definite action by the proba-
tion officer-the filing of a petition. Id. In most cases, "the determination whether
or not to file a petition shall be in the sole discretion of the probation officer." PRO-
POSED RUmEs, supra note 2, Rule 1307(f).
105. CAL.WELF. & INSTNS CODB ANN. §'654 (West Supp. 1976).
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majority of cases do not result in a petition being filed.10 6 The basic
concept of the law is that the decision to file, and by necessary impli-
cation the decision not to file, is one to be made by the probation of-
ficer using his own professional expertise and guidelines as his stand-
ard. The language of Rule 1307(f) seems to take into account this
problem by providing:
[Tihe determination whether or not to file a petition shall be in the
sole discretion of the probation officer.
10 7
However, the Rules as a whole are contradictory. They tend to con-
fuse the probation officer's traditional prerogatives with the functioning
of the juvenile court judge.
The framers of the Arnold-Kennick Juvenile Court Law'08 gave very
careful consideration to the question of the role that ought to be played
by the juvenile court judge (and inferentially by the Judicial Council
in framing rules). They came to the conclusion that the essential role
of the judge was to "act as a judicial check on an administrative
agency."' 1 9  This important concept seems lost throughout Chapter II
of the Rules" 0 which appears to mandate the tests to be followed by
the probation officer in filing or not filing."'
106. CAL. YOUTH AuTHoRrry, HIDDEN CLOSETS, A STUDY OF DETENTION PRACTICES
IN CALIFORNIA 1 (1975).
107. PROPOSED RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1307(f).
108. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. §§ 500-945 (West 1972).
109. GOVERNOR'S SPECIAL STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S SPECIAL
STUDY COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 39 (1948) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION
REPORT].
110. See, e.g., PROPOSED RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1307(g). That provision appears
to limit the discretion of the probation officer if the minor exhibits criminal sophistica-
tion, if the disposition imposed by the juvenile court cannot be completed before the
minor reaches age 21, if the minor has a previous delinquent history, if the minor hasn't
responded well to previous rehabilitative attempts, and/or if the minor is alleged to have
committed a grave offense.
111. The tests mandated are themselves often either erroneous or unclear.
Proposed Rules, supra note 2, Rule 1307(b) (1) (C) provides that matters not serious
enough to require official action may be referred to a nonjudicial agency available in the
community. This poorly worded subdivision seems to imply that if it appears to the pro-
bation officer that sufficient evidence is present to bring the minor within the jurisdiction
of the court and the matter is considered serious, the probation officer must file a peti-
tion. The result of this interpretation of the subdivision contradicts Rule 1307(f) by re-
moving the probation officer's individual discretion to divert minors in appropriate cases.
An example of the poor results that might come about from the interpretation above is
the situation where a minor, aged ten years, is involved in armed robbery with other
older minors and is taken into custody. The minor has no previous contacts with the
law and it appears to the probation officer that CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. §
654 (West Supp. 1976) informal probation would be in order. However, if this Rule is
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The snare into which the draftsmen of the Rules have fallen is well
illustrated by Rule 1307 (a), which provides:
The presiding judge of the juvenile court shall initiate meetings and
cooperate with the probation department, welfare department, prose-
cuting attorney, law enforcement and other persons and agencies per-
forming an intake function to establish and maintain a fair and efficient
intake program . . . and to initiate whatever course of action appears
necessary and desirable.
112
The judge of the juvenile court cannot be a judicial check on an admin-
istrative system and at the same time have the basic responsibility for
establishing and coordinating activities relating to intake policy. It was
exactly this kind of practice that was so strongly criticized by the
Governor's Special Study Commission. 113  If the Advisory Commit-
tee is intent on following this approach, it should provide that no supe-
rior court judge who acts as a meeting "initiator"' 11 or "cooperator" 115
shall hear juvenile court matters.
D. Hearings Before Referees
California uses referees in its juvenile courts." 6  The Rules con-
tinue to validate their use. Referees are subordinate judicial offi-
cials117 whose authority is ill-defined by law"" but clearly is less than
that of a juvenile court judge. 19 They must be members of the Cali-
fornia Bar with five years experience, 2 ° but under various "grand-
father provisions" 2 some non-lawyer referees still serve. Referees
generally hear all types of matters, including contested trials and hear-
ings to determine the fitness of a minor to remain in the juvenile courts.
Rule 1316(a) provides that referees shall "perform subordinate ju-
dicial duties."' 22  The question of exactly how "subordinate judicial
interpreted to mean only non-serious crimes can be diverted, and armed robbery is con-
sidered to be a serious crime, then the probation officer under the Rule must file a
petition.
112. PROPOSED RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1307 (a).
113. COMMIsSION REPORT, supra note 109.
114. A function provided for by PROPOSED RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1307(a).
115. Id.
116. PROPOSED RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1316(a).
117. Id.
118. See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 554 (West Supp. 1976).
119. Id.
120. CAL. WFLF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 553 (West 1972).
121. Id.
122. PROPOSED RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1316(a).
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duties" should be defined is beyond the scope of this article. The
question is not an easy one, but it is one that the Rules, not the appel-
late courts, should deal with. A narrowly drawn definition would prevent
any challenge from arising in the first place. From a pragmatic view-
point it is more important to focus on the types of cases a referee should
handle, rather than on the scope of his powers. If one were to take
such an approach, the result would be that, over the objections of the
minor or his parents, a referee would be permitted to hear only cases
in which the probation officer certified that removal of the minor from
the home would not be sought. If removal were sought, the minor,
if he so desires, ought to have the right to be heard before a constitu-
tional officer,123 one who does not serve at the mere whim and pleasure
of the juvenile court judge.'24
The Committee, unfortunately, did not choose to grapple with the
problem presented in this area, and as a result simply restated, in al-
most the same words, the ambiguous and relatively uninterpreted law.
For example, the California Supreme Court in the case of In re Edgar
M. 12 5 held that referees may perform only subordinate judicial duties,
and threw the law into a state of chaos by failing to clearly set forth
the boundaries thereof. Rule 1316(a) simply provides that referees
may perform "subordinate judicial duties" without giving any amplifica-
tion or clarification.
In the only area where the law is clear, but its application is not,
the Committee failed to properly set guidelines for application. This
area pertains to how the decision is to be made on whether proceed-
ings before a referee are taken down by a court reporter. Rule 1317
(a)(1) states that proceedings are to be reported when directed by
the judge. This repeats existing law.' 26 The preferable approach would
be to establish uniform statewide standards. In Los Angeles County
every proceeding is reported. Practice in other counties varies. There is
no justification for varying standards. From the viewpoint of the minor
there could be no objection if he had an absolute right to a reporter
123. Fears that the juvenile court system would collapse under demands for judge-
supervised trials are simply unrealistic. The trial bench always has demonstrated creativ-
ity in coping with unreasonable demands. No competent lawyer will want to antagonize
a judge by refusing to have most cases tried before a competent referee, particularly if
the court adopts the practice of assigning such cases to a judge generally considered un-
desirable. However, the presence of such provisions will guarantee that referees are of
the highest quality.
124. CAL. WELF. & 'INsT'NS CODE ANN. § 553 (West 1972).
125. 14 Cal. 3d 727, 537 P.2d 406, 122 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1975).
126. CAL. WELI. & INsi'Ns CODE ANN. § 677 (West 1972).
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if he so desired, and an absolute right to the absence of a reporter if
he so desired. From a policy viewpoint, assuming a ready availability
of reporters throughout the state, there is no reason for variation.
E. Rehearings of Orders of Referees
The extent to which decisions by a referee are subject to review by
a judge depends on a number of factors. The most important factor
is whether the proceedings before a referee are taken down by a court
ieporter. The Rules provide that if the proceedings are not fully re-
ported the minor is entitled as a matter of right to a rehearing. 27 Such
hearing is in the nature of a trial de novo before the juvenile court
judge. 2 " If the proceedings are fully reported, 'the Rules give the judge
power to decide whether or not to grant a rehearing after reading a tran-
script of the proceedings. 12 9  The application for rehearing must be
acted upon within twenty days following its receipt 3 ' unless the court,
for good cause, extends the period to forty-five days.' 3 ' If 'the applica-
tion is not denied within the prescribed time periods, it is .deemed
granted.1
8 2
The Proposed Rules do clear up one area. They require that if a
rehearing is granted it must be commenced within ten days of the date
of the order granting it, except that the rehearing must commence
within two days in the case of a detention hearing.'33 In the case of
detention hearings, however, the Rule appears to make a bad situation
worse. At the present time detention orders of a referee normally are
reviewed via habeas corpus, which involves no delay.'3 4 Rehearing is
an inadequate remedy because of the twenty to forty-five day period
available to the court in which to review the decision. Most detained
minors come to trial within twenty-one calendar days, 3 5 thereby mak-
127. PROPOSED RuLEs, supra note 2, Rule 1319(b).
128. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 560 (West 1972).
129. PROPOSED RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1319(c). See also CAr. WELF. & INST'NS
CODE ANN. § 558 (West 1972).
130. CAL. WELF. & INsT'Ns CODE ANN. § 558 (West 1972).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. PROPOSED Rur.s, supra note 2, Rule 1319(e).
134. See In re Dennis H., 19 Cal. App. 3d 350, 96 Cal. Rptr. 791 (1971).
135. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 657 (West 1972) states:
Mhe petition must be set for hearing within 15 judicial days from the day of the
order of the court directing such detention.
Id.
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ing an application for rehearing moot. Ideally the Rules should be re-
vised to establish some specific procedure for obtaining quick review
of detention orders. 3 6 If not, at least Rule 1319(f) should be revised
to remove the inference that habeas corpus is not available until a re-
quest for a rehearing has been made and acted on in detention matters.
137
Rule 1319(d), restating Welfare and Institutions Code section
559,'38 provides that the judge of the juvenile court on his own motion
under certain circumstances may hold a rehearing of a matter decided
before a referee. The major problem arises when a referee has acquit-
ted a minor, and on the motion of the district attorney or probation
officer, often made ex parte and without notice,8 9 a rehearing is
granted. A number of cases have upheld this procedure. 14  Breed
v. Jones 4' has seriously undermined the rationale of those cases. In
Breed the United States Supreme Court held that once an adjudicatory
hearing began the minor was in jeopardy. It then became too late to
try to move the case to the adult courts for the minor to be tried as
an adult.' 42  The court reasoned that the minor already had begun to
run the gauntlet when the trial began. The same rationale is true here.
The minor will have been put to the emotional strain and expense of
putting on his entire case and winning, only to be forced to start anew
because the juvenile court judge wants to start anew. The problem
136. PROPOSED RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1319(e) provides that a rehearing granted
on detention shall be heard within two days after the granting of a rehearing. The prob-
lem here is that the granting of a rehearing on detention may take as long as forty-five
days. Thus, with the additional two days after the granting of a rehearing on detention,
the minor may be detained up to forty-seven days. It appears that on the issue of deten-
tion a different and more appropriate procedure for faster review should be created.
Perhaps a procedure providing for automatic review before a judge of the juvenile court
of a detention order made by a referee, to be heard within two judicial days of the de-
tention hearing, would be the best way to deal with the problem. The minor should be
provided with a speedy procedure for review of a detention order since an order of
detention is not reviewable on appeal.
137. That Rule is not as clear as it could be, particularly because of the use of the
undefined term "should." It reads as follows:
Any person seeking review of the order and findings of a referee should apply for a
rehearing by the juvenile court judge under this rule prior to appealing or seeking
other appropriate relief from the Court of Appeal.
PROPOSED RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1319(f).
138. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 559 (West 1972).
139. See R. WALKER, CALiFoRNA JUVENILE CounT PPACcE §§ 154-56 (Supp. Nov.
1975).
140. See, e.g., In re Edgar M., 14 Cal. 3d 727, 537 P.2d 406, 122 Cal. Rptr. 574
(1975); Donald L. v. Superior Ct., 7 Cal. 3d 592, 498 P.2d 1098, 102 Cal. Rptr. 850
(1972); In re Dale S., 10 Cal. App. 3d 952, 89 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1970).
141. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
142. See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 707 (West Supp. 1976).
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can be remedied by not permitting the judge to grant a rehearing on
his own motion when the minor has been acquitted.
F. The Granting of Immunity to Witnesses at Hearings
Rule 1342(d) authorizes the juvenile court to grant witnesses "use
immunity" to protect them from use of their testimony against them
in criminal or juvenile proceedings. As the comments to the Rule
point out,143 the law authorizes the granting of the much broader trans-
actional immunity in 'both felony and misdemeanor proceedings. 144 The
rulemakers claim that "it would seem to be beyond the scope of the
rulemaking power to establish by rule in the juvenile courts a basis for
granting transactional immunity to a witness."'1 45 None of the cases
cited by the Advisory Committee stand for the proposition that the Ju-
dicial Council lacks the power to grant such immunity.146 The man-
date to prepare rules is broad, and should be fully exercised to avoid
the unfortunate result of granting use immunity alone.1
47
G. Time Periods and Dismissals of Petitions
The law provides for strict time periods for bringing cases to trial' 48
but does not state the consequences of a dismissal for failure to do so.
In a similar vein, the law provides for the probation officer to file the
petition, 49 but it is silent on how, if at all, the probation officer may
dismiss the petition before the time of trial, with or without prejudice.
These problems need to be remedied.
The importance of time limits in the juvenile court cannot be over-
stated. The goal is one of speedy hearings. Procedures which permit
cases to be dismissed without prejudice as a matter of course and imme-
143. PRoPosED RuLEs, supra note 2, at 5-12.
144. CAL. PENAL CoDE §§ 1324, 1324.1 (West 1970).
145. PROPOSED RuLEs, supra note 2, at 5-12.
146. See cases cited in PRoPosED RULES, supra note 2, at 5-11 to 5-13.
147. The granting of use immunity in the juvenile court, rather than transactional im-
munity as in adult criminal cases, could have a rather bizarre effect on a minor who
has a co-participant who is also being tried in the juvenile court. In the case of In re
Eugene M., 55 Cal. App. 3d 650, 127 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1976), the court stated that the
uncorroborated testimony of a co-participant is sufficient to establish that a crime has
been committed. Thus, if Minor "A" is given use immunity and must testify as to his
part in a robbery which implicates his co-participant, Minor "B," then Minor "B" could
also be given use immunity thereby allowing him to testify against "A". Both minors
will convict each other.
148. CAL. WELF. & INSr'Ns CODE ANN. § 657 (West 1972).
149. Id. § 650.
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diately refiled totally destroy this objective of the law.1 0 The Rules
should provide that all dismissals for failure to meet time deadlines are
with prejudice. There is no other way to ensure that the juvenile jus-
tice system will move forward quickly. 5'
A related problem involves the power of a probation officer to dis-
miss a petition once it is filed. The investigation by counsel for the
minor often establishes that a petition never should have been filed.
This occurs because it is established that informal supervision would
be appropriate 52 or because the minor is innocent or because venue
would better lay in a different county. The probation officer may then
take the position that he lacks the power to dismiss. The Rules should
grant the power to dismiss, either with or without prejudice, subject
to approval by the court in such circumstances.
H. Reading Dispositional Reports Before Trial
Frequently the probation officer will prepare a complete disposi-
tional report prior to trial, setting forth a social history and recom-
mended disposition on the assumption that the allegations of the peti-
tion will be proven. In the case of In re Gladys R.153 the Supreme
Court of California held that it was prejudicial error in a delinquency
proceeding for the judge to read the report because it could improperly
affect his judgment. Subdivision (d) of Rule 1355 raises an analogous
problem. It provides that a judge or referee will not be barred from
hearing a case because he has read a social study concerning the same
minor in a previous case.
The problem can be best illustrated by an example: In January,
Peter is charged with armed robbery. In February, a dispositional
hearing is held following Peter's admission that -the allegations are true,
and the petition is sustained. In June, Peter again is charged with a
more recent armed robbery. Under the Rule as written, the judge who
originally tried him for the old offense could try him for the new of-
fense, despite the fact that the social history information, which Gladys
R. says can be prejudicial at the adjudicatory hearing, is still fresh in
150. Contra, Neil G. v. Superior Ct., 30 Cal. App. 3d 572, 106 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1973).
151. One of the more outrageous cases recently encountered by the authors involved
a case set for trial on the last day permitted by law. The district attorney came in de-
manding a continuance, his only excuse being that through an office foul-up none of
his witnesses had been subpoenaed. The court granted the continuance, reasoning that
if it did not do so, the prosecutor would merely file again.
152. CAI. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 654 (West Supp. 1976).
153. 1 Cal. 3d 855, 464 P.2d 127, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1970).
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the judge's mind. The Proposed Rule needs to be changed to prevent
the same judge from hearing the new petition.
L Right to Counsel for Parents in Dependency and Neglect Cases
The right of parents to counsel in dependency and neglect cases is
unclear. The decision in Cleaver v. Wilcox 5 laid down a rule sum-
marized by the Advisory Committee as follows:
[-n Cleaver, it was held that an indigent parent in a dependency case
has a due process right to court-appointed counsel whenever the parent
is unable to adequately present the case and faces a substantial possi-
bility of the loss of custody or of prolonged separation from a child.
Factors suggested for a juvenile court to consider when deciding whether
to appoint counsel for the parent in these cases include the complexity
of the case, the likelihood of removal of the child, the probability of
prolonged removal and whether the parent intends to contest the
matter.15
5
Subsequently, in the case of In re Simeth, 56 the California Court of Ap-
peals held that there was -an automatic right to counsel on appeal for
parents in Welfare and Institutions Code section 600' 7 dependency pro-
ceedings. Rule 1334 should make appointment mandatory at the trial
level unless there is a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to
counsel by the parents after conferring with prospective defense counsel.
In the experience of the authors, who have handled over one hundred
cases arising under Welfare and Institutions Code section 600,158 there
has not been a single case in which the parent could have adequately rep-
resented himself or herself. What parent is adequately able to present
the case? The law is complicated. Rules of evidence must be under-
stood. Lines of defense may not be obvious. The simplest case, when
properly prepared, often becomes complex. The likelihood of removal
of the child from the home is always hard to estimate. Even if the
likelihood of removal in a given case seems slight it may still be obvious
that the groundwork for removal is being laid for "next time." Given
the success of the Los Angeles program where all parents are repre-
sented, and the anomaly of an automatic right to free counsel on appeal
but no automatic right to counsel at the trial level, the Rules should
154. 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974).
155. PROPOSED RULEs, supra note 2, at 7-33 to 7-34.
156. 40 Cal. App. 3d 982, 115 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1974).
157. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 600 (West 1972).
158. Id.
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provide for free counsel at the trial level except when there is an intel-
ligent waiver following consultation with prospective defense counsel.
J. Other Matters
In addition to all the foregoing, which present policy matters of major
substance and importance, the Rules contain numerous other substan-
tive and technical defects of less concern to general readers. These
defects'are of importance because they demonstrate an additional rea-
son why more time must be taken to revise the Rules. Following are
some examples of these defects.
1. Rule 1302(a)(3): Definition of "Detained"
The definition of "detained" leads to odd results. The term is de-
fined as "any removal of the minor from the person or persons legally
entitled to the physical custody of the minor."1"" This definition cre-
ates ambiguities in the law. For instance, suppose the mother of a
minor child, through dissolution proceedings, is awarded custody of a
minor but, after a period of time, the mother decides to let the father
have custody of the minor without any court action. While staying with
the father, the minor is taken into custody for commission of a criminal
offense. Under the proposed definition of "detained" this minor is not
"detained" because he was not removed from the person legally enti-
tled to physical custody. Another example of the definition's impact
arises from the situation where a grandparent may have physical custody
of a minor child because the parents have recently passed away. No
formal guardianship has been created and the minor child then gets into
some sort of problem and is taken into custody. Again, under the defi-
nition, the minor is not detained. This definition obviously needs to be
changed.
2. Probation Officers and Social Workers Serving
as Deputy County Clerks
The present undesirable practice of having probation officers and so-
cial workers appointed deputy county clerks for convenience in filing
petitions and sending out notices to be signed by the clerk has not been
noted or forbidden by the Proposed Rules. There should be a provision
in Rule 1309 (c)'"I preventing a probation officer or social worker from
159. PROPOsED RuLEs, supra note 2, Rule 1302(a) (3).
160. Id. Rule 1309(c) deals with the required content of a notice of hearing.
[Vol. 10
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acting in a dual role as a deputy county clerk and as probation officer
or social worker. This would prevent improper acts of the probation
officer or social worker in attempting to get around requirements for
filing petitions. When a probation officer or social worker also acts
as a county clerk, there is opportunity for mischief such as backdating
a petition to be timely filed. This Rule would prevent any possible in-
discretions by such officers by requiring them to separate their roles
and duties, thus providing further protection for the minor. It would
also prevent unseemly claims of indiscretion, whether true or false.
3. Provisions for the Disqualification of Referees
The California Supreme Court in the case of In re Edgar M."6' held
that the disqualification procedures of Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 170.6162 do not apply to juvenile court referees or to superior court
commissioners sitting as juvenile court referees. There is no rational
reason why litigants in every other field of the law should be able to
make such disqualifications as a matter of law merely by filing an affi-
davit stating that in the opinion of counsel a fair and impartial trial can-
not be had before the referee in question. Such a rule would be a
rule of procedure well within the rule-making power of the Judicial
Council.
4. Rule 1318(a): Effective Date of Referee Orders
A rather irrational rule has been adopted providing that the order
of a referee remains in full force and effect even though the judge has
granted a rehearing and the case is to be retried. 63 This rule goes
directly against present case law. It was stated in the case of In re
Dale S.:16 4
It appears to us that it was the legislative intent in providing for the
right to apply for a rehearing, to insure that a child, his parent or guard-
ian, has that safeguard in every case heard before a referee. In short,
we conclude that any order of a referee, approved or not, is conditional
until the time for granting a rehearing pursuant to section 558 has
elapsed. And, where a rehearing is granted, as here, the referee's
order becomes a nullity and there is no double jeopardy.
165
161. 14 Cal. 3d 727, 537 P.2d 406, 122 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1975).
162. CAL. CODE Civ. PRO. § 170.6 (West Supp. 1976).
163. PROPOSED RuLEs, supra note 2, Rule 1318(a).
164. 10 Cal. App. 3d 952, 89 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1970).
165. Id. at 956-57, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 502 (emphasis added).
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A juvenile court judge has the power to detain a minor and if the minor
was previously placed outside the parents' home, the judge may con-
tinue that placement pending the new detention hearing.' 60 Since an
order granting a rehearing allows the minor a completely new hearing,
it follows that to invalidate any order of a referee predicated on the
previous adjudication is appropriate. If the Committee adopts the Dale
S. procedure, then it will be necessary to adopt additional rules to de-
fine the time limitations applicable upon granting a rehearing.
5. Service of Notice of Hearings
Service of notice of hearings on the attorney for the minor is deemed
service on the parents, 16 7 despite the fact that a conflict of interest may
exist and the attorney for the minor might have strong motivation to
see that the parents never receive notice. This Rule should provide
that upon service of the minor's attorney, the attorney must make all
diligent efforts to notify the parents. In any event, if the parents and
minor are separately represented by counsel, how could notice on the
attorney for the minor be deemed constitutionally sufficient notice on
the minor's parents? Again, it should be noted that this is a restate-
ment of the statute. 6 8 However, to add the above interpretation to
the Rules would not be inconsistent with the statute-it would only in-
terpret it in a manner which would eliminate any constitutional prob-
lems.
6. The Right to Advisory Juries
Rule 1313(c) recognizes the power of the juvenile court to impanel
an advisory jury. However, it fails to give any guidance as to when
or how such a jury should or should not be impaneled. There should
be a procedure established to determine how these proceedings are to
be conducted. The Rule could provide that a jury must be impaneled
whenever the petitioner is contemplating removal of the minor from
the parent's custody.
7. Appointment of Counsel
Rule 1353(c) provides for counsel for a minor "unless there is an
intelligent waiver of the minor's right to counsel by the minor
166. See CAL. WELF. INST'NS CoDE ANN. § 636 (West 1972).
167. PROPOSED RuLEs, supra note 2, Rule 1309(i).
168. CAL. WELF. & INSm'NS CODE ANN. § 570 (West 1972).
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... "I Waiver of counsel is too important a step to be entrusted
to the minor, even after consultation with his parents. Since this is a
delicate area, the Rules should set out a standard, minimum require-
ment to be satisfied before a waiver is to be accepted by the court.
Perhaps the court should appoint counsel to speak with the minor be-
fore waiver of counsel will be accepted, thereby protecting the minor's
right to make an intelligent waiver.
Rule 1353(d) states that:
In any case in which it appears to the court that there is such a con-
flict of interest between a parent or guardian and the minor that one
attorney could not properly represent both, the court shall take appro-
priate action to eliminate the conflict of interest.
70
What "appropriate action" should be taken remains undefined. Guid-
ance as to what should be done is needed.
8. Procedures for Handling Suppression Motions
Rule 1354(b) provides for the hearing of motions to suppress prior
to the attachment of jeopardy. It leaves the procedural details to be
established by local court rules. The problem with leaving such impor-
tant procedures to local court rules is that often no rules are prepared
or the rules that are prepared are so administratively restrictive that
they may deny a minor an opportunity to be heard. An example of
this latter problem exists in the Los Angeles County local rules where,
for a motion to suppress, there is a requirement of ten days written
notice prior to the adjudicatory hearing.' 7 ' This form of notice puts
an undue burden on defense counsel in a detained matter to file a writ-
ten notice to suppress within ten days of the detention hearing. Such
a practice, at least in misdemeanors, goes directly against case law.'7 2
To ,avoid these problems, the Rules should establish a uniform and fair
procedure for motions to suppress.
9. Rules of Pleading
One of the most difficult areas in Welfare and Institutions Code sec-
tion 600 hearings is knowing what is a sufficient allegation so that, if
169. PRoPoSED RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1353 (c).
170. Id. Rule 1353 (d).
171. JUVENILE COURT POLICY MEMORANDUM OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF Los
ANGELES COUNTY, Revised Detention Court Policy Memorandum, subsection 9 (April
27, 1976).
172. See People v. Manning, 33 Cal. App. 3d 586, 109 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1973).
1976]
106 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
it were found true, the court could take jurisdiction over the minor.
For instance, is an allegation that a parent has a dirty home sufficient
to bring a minor within the jurisdiction of the court? This problem
comes up every day in the juvenile court and is not dealt with in these
Rules. The authors urge that the Advisory Committee take a position
as to what allegations would be sufficient to allow the court to take
jurisdiction. This could be done, in part, by use of sample forms.
10. Further Problems
The foregoing discussion dealt with examples of further defects in
the Rules that need attention. These examples are by no means ex-
haustive.' However, they do highlight the need for further consider-
ation of the Rules.
173. Following is a listing of other problems with the Rules that need attention.
The definition of "notice" improperly has substantive law built into it. Rule 1302(a)
(6) provides that notice, when required, "shall be given to or made on the party's attor-
ney of record, if any .... ." PROPOSED RULEs, supra note 2, Rule 1302(a)(6). This
is not properly a definition and therefore does not belong in the definitional section.
While the terms "shall" and "may" are defined by Rule 1302(b)(1), the term
"should" is left undefined. Some Rules in which the term "should" appears are: PRo-
POSED RuLEs, supra note 2, Rules 1307(e), 1307(f), 1308(b), 1319(f), 1321(b), 1328
(a), 1331(c), 1338(a), 1341(h), 1342(c), 1364(b), 1378(d). The term "should" must
either be defined or replaced as appropriate with the terms "shall" or "may."
The term "affidavit" is also left undefined. Since there is some confusion among at-
torneys as to the distinction between "affidavit" and "declaration," it would seem appro-
priate for the Rules to define the term. This will provide guidance to the practicing
attorney in the juvenile court.
In Rule 1307 general rules of venue are laid down. But there is no preference stated
to be followed in selecting the court. If no preference is intended, the Rule should so
indicate.
There are also numerous problems in the Rules dealing with the review and filing
of petitions. Rule 1307(f) provides that "[p]rior to the filing of a petition under sec-
tion 602 by the probation officer, the district attorney or other designated legal officer
shall review the petition for legal sufficiency." PROPOSED RuL.S, supra note 2, Rule
1307(f). The problem inherent in this Rule is that there is no provision for the legal
officer to sign the petition thereby indicating he has reviewed it.
Rule 1307(g) (2) provides that probation officers, in deciding whether or not they are
to file petitions, must take into account whether the offense charged would be a felony
if committed by an adult. The correct test ought to be whether the district attorney
in the adult courts would be likely to charge the offense as a felony. Most felonies
are in fact felony/misdemeanors and commonly are charged as misdemeanors.
Filing of a petition is mandatory in cases certified by the municipal court, CAL. WELl7.
& INS'NS CODE ANN. § 604(c) (West Supp. 1976), and in cases involving aggravated
assault or battery on a public school employee, id. § 653.5. However, no procedure is
supplied for dismissing such petitions which are improvidently filed. Such a procedure
should be provided for in the Rules.
Rule 1312(d) provides for free transcripts for indigents but no procedures are outlined
for obtaining such transcripts.
Rule 1318(b) provides that orders by a referee removing a minor from the home re-
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Advisory Committee and the staff are to be commended for
turning out a document that can serve as the starting point for drafting
a meaningful set of Rules for the Juvenile Court. The Rules in their
final form are compiled in a logical sequence, and help to create organi-
zation out of statutory provisions which are organized in a helter-skelter
fashion. The Rules and the comments of the Advisory Committee wil
serve as a springboard for a meaningful discussion.
However, the Rules are in no way ready for adoption. They
simply have not received input and consideration from the various
broad elements that are involved in the juvenile justice system. The
result is that diverse viewpoints do not even appear to have been con-
sidered. What is needed is an expanded, broad-based Advisory Com-
mittee to take on the further revision of the Rules. Such a committee
should include not only the eight trial judges on the present Advisory
Committee, but also prosecutors, public defenders, county counsel, de-
fense attorneys and legal scholars, as well as probation officers, social
workers, and law enforcement officers. Finally there should be citizen
input from both adults and minors.
Rules are needed. But fifteen years have passed since they were
mandated, and another year of delay is well worth it as the price for
a set of rules which rise to the level one expects for the State of Cali-
fornia.
VIII. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS AND SOME SUGGESTIONS
A. Adoption of the Rules as Revised
The Proposed Juvenile Court Rules, revised in the fashion hereinafter
quire the approval of a judge. However, the Rules lack guidelines for what a juvenile
court judge should consider in making the determination to approve or disapprove a pre-
vious order of a referee. There is a need to establish the procedure and requirements for
a judge to act under this subdivision. For instance, if a judge is to approve a referee's
order to remove a minor from his parents' home, must the judge review the transcript
of the proceedings? Must the judge speak personally with the referee or get something
in writing that explains the referee's reasoning? This area needs guidelines since the
case law has not provided the court with a clear method of operation. See, e.g., In re
Edgar M., 14 Cal. 3d 727, 537 P.2d 406, 122 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1975).
Rule 1319(c) restates CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 558 (1972) which specific-
ally requires good cause to be shown for an extension of up to forty-five days for the
granting of a rehearing. Yet, this subdivision is silent as to what is good cause in the
area of extension of time beyond the original twenty days. Is reporter's delay on tran-
scription good cause for this extension? Guidance is needed in this area.
Discovery provisions in the Rules need attention. Rule 1341(b) provides that the pe-
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titioner furnish favorable information in his "possession or control." The phrase "pos-
session and control" needs to be clarified so that attorneys are put on notice as to what
materials must be furnished.
Other discovery provisions are vague or ineffective. Rule 1341(e) provides for a mo-
tion requiring timely disclosure if requested disclosure is refused. It further provides that
local rules may be established for the manner and limitation of such motions. Since
this section does not make it mandatory for a county to establish local rules, this Rule
should establish specific requirements for the manner and limitations, absent local rules
to the contrary. Alternatively, the Rules should make it mandatory for the county to
establish local rules.
If a party is granted discovery under Rule 1341(h) and the request proposes a
time for compliance, the moving party should have the right to a specific com-
pliance date. Therefore, the phrase "may prescribe terms and conditions" should
be replaced with "shall upon request of either party prescribe terms and conditions."
Thus, all orders granting discovery, where a compliance date is requested, will include
specific compliance dates.
Rule 1352, providing grounds for continuance of a jurisdiction hearing, is unclear
as to its effect on detained cases. It is uncertain whether the seven day continuances
may extend the fifteen day limitation on detained matters. The Rules cannot expand
statutes. By not making this clear as to the time limits on detained minors, the Rule
is expanding the time limits beyond the statutory time limits. This would be beyond
the authority of the Rules. See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 570 (West 1972).
Provision for waiver of reading of formal documents when the minor is present in
court with counsel is omitted. See PnoPosED RuLES, supra note 2, Rule 1353(a). This
common practice should either be permitted or expressly forbidden.
Rule 1356(b) gives the court discretion on whether to release a detained minor upon
the granting of a continuance. However, the Rule gives no guidance on the standards
to apply or factors to be considered in choosing to detain or release the minor. The
same standard should be followed as applies originally to detention.
Rule 1361(c) provides for precedence on the calendar of the court for detained minors
in CAL. WELF. & INST'Ns CODE ANN. § 600 (West 1972) cases. What is meant by the
calendar of the court? In Los Angeles, section 600 cases are heard in one facility with
up to five courtrooms working simultaneously. Does "calendar of the court" mean in
this context that a detained section 600 case must be heard before any non-detained case
in the building, thereby requiring transfer from court to court ahead of non-detained
matters? Or does priority in these cases mean only in the individual courtroom where
the case was assigned? Or does it apply to all courts hearing juvenile cases? This area
needs clarification.
Rule 1361(d) provides for a tolling of the period for a hearing if the minor's neglect
or failure to appear causes a delay. The problem with the language is that it gives no
consideration to the situation where the minor is hospitalized and cannot appear. It
seems unfair to the parents in a CAL. WELF. & INS'NS CODE 600 (West 1972) case to not
allow them an opportunity for a speedy trial where it is the minor's unavoidable absence
that has caused the delay. There should be a provision for some remedy in situations
such as these.
Provisions regarding pleas, PROPosED RuLEs, supra note 2, Rule 1364(b), need to be
expanded to take into account the party who stands mute. There is a need to provide
that the parent or guardian be informed that if he or she chooses to remain silent, a
denial of the allegation will be entered on the record.
There should be a provision in Rule 1366 requiring that upon request of counsel for
the minor, parent or guardian, the court shall continue the matter for a reasonable period
of time for the purpose of preparing for the dispositional hearing. This is fundamentally
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noted,174 were adopted in final form by the Judicial Council on Novem-
ber 13, 1976, effective as of July 1, 1977. The vote to adopt was
unanimous. In the authors' opinions this unanimity was prompted pri-
marily by the expiration of the terms of office of most of the members
of the Council on January 31, 1977, and by the retirement of Chief
Justice Wright, ex-officio Chairman of the Council, announced effective
as of February 1, 1977. The possibility existed that if adoption of the
Rules was delayed, an almost entirely new Council appointed by a new
Chief Justice would be considering them. A new Council, which had
not been involved in the development of the Rules, would not be able
to effectively handle questions regarding their adoption.
The unanimous approval of the Rules -at first seemed surprising.
At the Superior Court Committee of the Council, which met two days
earlier, the Rules had been adopted in final form by only a three to two
vote, the chairman casting the deciding vote. Members of the State
Bar of California in the Committee opposed adoption on the basis that,
through a breakdown in communications, the State Bar had not had
an adequate opportunity -to review the Rules. At and following the
fair in that it will allow the minor, parent, or guardian the right to have sufficient time
to prepare.
Findings allowing the court to remove a minor from the custody of his parent or
guardian do not necessitate that custody of the child by the parent or guardian be to
the minor's detriment. PROPOSED Rut s, supra note 2, Rule 1372(b) (1), (2). Yet this
finding is required by the California Civil Code:
Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or persons other
than a parent, without the consent of the parents, it shall make a finding that an
award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child and the award to a
nonparent is required to serve the best interests of the child.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1976). A change should therefore be made in the
rules.
Rule 1376(b) requires that recommendations for removal of a minor from the parent's
custody be accompanied by a plan for reuniting the minor with the family. This is an
excellent provision, but no guidance is given as to what consequences may result if the
petitioners fail to implement the plan through inadvertence or neglect and without fault
of the minor or the minor's parents or guardian.
Rule 1377(g) provides for a fifteen day review of the case of a minor in custody who
is awaiting placement. The court is "to determine whether the delay is reasonable."
What if the delay is unreasonable? There is no guidance as to what a judge can or
should do in this situation. Nor is it clear whether there must be informal hearings
in open court with the probation officer present.
Rule 1378(a) provides that the court shall determine whether jurisdiction over the
minor is to be continued or terminated annually. This annual review should take into
account the return of the child to the home under supervision.
There are no guidelines in Rule 1391(b) for what allegations shall be contained in
supplemental petitions sufficient to allow the court to take jurisdiction over the minor.
There is need for such guidelines.
174. See notes 175-80 infra and accompanying text.
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full council meeting on October 13, however, it was made clear that the
Advisory Committee would give full consideration to any "serious"
comments and suggested revision the State Bar wished to make, and
that time still remained before July 1, 1977, to make any critical amend-
ments to the Rules. Apparently on that understanding, State Bar
representatives voted in favor of the Rules.
B. Nature of the Revisions
The only major revision made by the Advisory Committee and adopt-
ed by -the Council was to provide for transactional immuniy in Welfare
and Institutions Code section 602175 (delinquency) cases, rather than
mere testimonial immunity.' 6 The reason for -this revision was that
new legislation' 17 categorized offenses committed by such juveniles as
felonies or misdemeanors, and that, therefore, one could look by analogy
to -the corresponding immunity provisions of the Penal Code.178
A variety of procedural and drafting suggestions were incorporated
into the Rules in response to various comments, including some suggested
in a draft of this article submitted to the Judicial Council. 17  In addi-
tion, adjustments were made to take into account a substantial amount
of new legislation adopted subsequent to the preparation of the Proposed
Rules and of this article.'"
175. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 602 (West 1972).
176. See notes 143-47 supra and accompanying text.
177. Stats. 1976, c. 1071 amending CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 702 (1972).
178. See K. Uebel (Administrative Office of the Courts), Revisions in Proposed
Juvenile Court Rules 6-7 (Nov. 3, 1976).
179. See id. at 5 n.6.
180. A summary of the effect of the legislation follows:
The Legislature was very active in the juvenile justice area during 1976, and at
least a dozen bills have been signed into law by the Governor. From the stand-
point of impact upon the proposed juvenile court rules, two bills were particularly
significant-SB 2172 and AB 3121.
SB 2172 (Robbins) (Stats. 1976, Ch. 1068), although making no substantive
changes in the juvenile court law, reorganized and renumbered substantial portions
of the law so as to completely separate references to dependent children proceed-
ings from those relating to potential wards of the court. For example, effective
January 1, 1977, dependency matters will be brought under Section 300 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code, instead of under Section 600. The enactment of
SB 2172 required numerous technical changes within the proposed rules and the
advisory committee's comments. These changes have been made and, as they are
nonsubstantive in nature, they generally will not be referred to hereinafter.
In contrast, AB 3121 (Dixon) (Stats. 1976, Ch. 1071) made significant changes in
the juvenile court system which, effective January 1, 1977, will have a substantial
impact in most California counties. Insofar as it will affect court procedures
touched upon by the proposed rules, it will do the following:
0 The prosecuting attorney, rather than the probation officer, will file section
602 petitions and appear throughout those proceedings (Welf. & Inst. Code
§§ 650, 681; see e.g., rules 1302(a)(6); 1307(f); 1308(a); 1311(c)(d));
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C. Recommended Revisions Before the Rules Come Into Effect
As noted earlier, the Judicial Council and its Advisory Committe have
expressed a willingness to consider some revisions in the Proposed Rules
prior to their effective date. At the same time, the Chairman of the
Advisory Committee has made it clear that only "serious" proposals
will be considered. Hence the objective of this portion of the article
is to reiterate -those few changes which are the most critical for the ju-
venile justice system.
First, primary attention should be focused on those provisions of the
* Juvenile court referees, as well as judges, may now be challenged under Code
of Civil Procedure sections 170 and 170.6 (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 170, 170.6;
Welf & Inst. Code § 553.2; see rule 1316(c));
* Detention-
-An alternative to secure detention, i.e., "release on home supervision," is
authorized, but the same legal protections are provided for the minor, in-
cluding a detention hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 628.1, 636, 840, 841;
see rules 1302(a)(3), 1321(h), 1327(a));
-Statutory criteria for detaining minors when necessary to protect the person
or property of another have been relaxed (Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 635, 636,
as amended by Stats. 1976, Ch. 1071, §§ 36, 37, 39; see rules 1327(a)(f),
1337(a) (c));
-Generally, minors against whom proceedings are brought under section 601
(so-called "status offenders") may not be placed in secure detention (Welf.
& Inst. Code §§ 507(b); 880; but see Welf. & Inst. Code § 636.2; see rule
1326(a));
* Fitness hearings for 16-17 year-old minors accused of designated violent of-
fenses are encouraged (but not mandated); minors so accused are presumed
unfit for juvenile court treatment, unless the contrary is found (Welf. & Inst.
Code § 707(b); see rule 1348(e)(f)(g);
* The rules of evidence established by the Evidence Code and judicial decisions
are explicitly made applicable to juvenile proceedings (Welf. & Inst. Code
§ 701; see rules 1355(c); 1365(c));
* In section 602 proceedings, the petition must allege and the court (in the case
of "wobbler" offenses) must find whether the violation alleged would be a
felony or a misdemeanor (Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 656.1, 702; see rules 1309(a)
1355(f));
* A minor declared a ward of the court under section 602 may not be com-
mitted or placed in a secure institutional setting for a period in excess of
"the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult
convicted of the offense which brought the minor under the jurisliction of the
juvenile court" (Welf. & Inst. Code § 726; see rule 1372(c)).
All of the above-listed changes have been incorporated into the proposed juvenile
court rules.
In addition to those rule changes noted above, the advisory committee also con-
sidered the impact of AB 3121 upon rule 1307 relating to intake and petitioning cri-
teria to be applied by the probation officer. Although the probation officer will no
longer file petitions in section 602 proceedings, he or she is still responsible under
the juvenile court law for conducting an initial investigation, making initial intake
and detention decisions and, whenever appropriate, requesting the prosecuting at-
torney to file a petition under section 602. The criteria set forth in rule 1307,
including those in rule 1307(g), are still relevant in that regard and, as so modified,
rule 1307 has been retained. The revised advisory committee comment relating
to rule 1307(g), however, makes it very clear that no attempt is made by the rule
to influence the prosecuting attorney's discretionary decision whether or not to
prosecute.
K. Uebel (Administrative Office of the Courts), Revisions in Proposed Juvenile Court
Rules 2-4 (Nov. 3, 1976).
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Rules dealing with detention prior to trial.' 8 ' Some improvement would
be obtained by prefacing the portion of the Rules dealing with detention
with -a statement that all intendments are against detention, and that
detention of any kind is to be avoided wherever possible. Broader
relief would be afforded by requiring the prosecuting attorney to pro-
duce the witnesses required for a hearing prescribed by In re Dennis
H.,'8 2 requiring affidavits to support all requests for continuances of
such hearings by the prosecuting attorney, and providing that all con-
tinuances be for only a day at -a time unless a strong showing is made
as to why a one day continfuance would be insufficient. Second, pro-
vision should be made for appointment of counsel as a matter of right
in all section 600 (dependency and neglect) cases.' 88  Third, a judge
should be prohibited from ordering, on his own motion, -a rehearing of
a case heard by a referee in which the referee has acquitted the minor.
1 8 4
A recent Court of Appeal case,' 85 which the California Supreme Court
has not yet reviewed, upheld this unfair practice. If the Court does
not have sufficient confidence in a referee to rely upon his acquittal, the
referee should not be allowed to try the case in the first place.
181. See notes 43-97 supra and accompanying text.
182. 19 Cal. App. 3d 350, 96 Cal. Rptr. 791 (1971).
183. CAL. WELl. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 600 (West 1972). See notes 154-58 supra
and accompanying text.
184. See notes 138-42 supra and accompanying text.
185. Jesse Lionel W. v. Superior Ct., 63 Cal. App. 3d 408, - Cal. Rptr. - (1976).
